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Brief of Appellants 
This suit was brought by the Town of North Salt 
Lake to condemn the water rights and water system of 
St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Company, a public 
utility. The complaint also asked for the condemnation 
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of a 600 feet pipeline extension. (R. 5) The complaint al-
leged that L. W. Gibbs claimed ownership of this 600 
feet extension. (R. 5) Gibbs claims in his answer that 
he and his wife owned it jointly, (R. 38) and his wife, 
Mary Godbe Gibbs, claimed joint ownership in her com-
plaint in intervention. (R. 48) 
This 600 feet extension was only part of a 2400 feet 
pipeline system constructed by the appellants Gibbs to 
connect the St. Joseph Water system with an area which 
was being developed by them for a housing project. (R. 
187-93, Ex. 5) The Gibbs, before building the pipeline, 
had applied to St. Joseph for 60 water connections. This 
application had been accepted and approved by St. 
Joseph and the connection charge of $20.00 each had been 
paid on forty of these accepted applications. (R. 199, Ex. 
8) Thereafter this 2400 feet extension line was construct-
ed at a cost in excess of $4,000.00. (R. 190-3) Other homes 
were in the process of construction and several building 
lots had been sold. (R. 195, 349) 
Thereafter a group of individuals who also were 
being served with culinary water by St. Joseph caused 
the Town of North Salt Lake to be incorporated. The in-
corporated limits of the Town were so fixed that all of 
the Gibbs development was excluded from the Town. 
(R. 10) Then this action was brought to condemn the 
water rights and water system of St. Joseph. The com-
plaint also sought to condemn 600 feet of the pipeline 
extension of the Gibbs. The balance of some 1800 feet of 
the Gibbs extension was not sought to be condemned. 
(R. 186-8). 
2 
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The Gibbs opposed the condemnation suit on the 
grounds that the property was already devoted to the 
-, highest public use. (R. 40, 50) They also contended that 
if the town were to be permitted to take that portion of 
the water supply and water system devoted to serve the 
Town area, that in any event the portion of the water and 
the water system available to serve the areas outside the 
Town could not be taken and the rights of those located 
outside the _Town had to be protected. (R. 40, 50) The 
eourt did require continued delivery of 6,000 gallons of 
water per day to the six completed homes, but permitted 
the Town to condemn all of the water rights and the 
system. (R. 127) Those living outside the Town were 
given rights to use the excess capacity of the system, 
(not the water) but this can better be noted in detail 
elsewhere. (R. 128) 
The Gibbs, after having had the court determine 
that the waters and system could be taken by eminent 
domain without obligation to furnish water to the Gibbs 
attempted to prove their damages, contending : ( 1) that 
the contract for sixty connections, for which they had 
paid $800.00, and the 600 feet of pipeline which the com-
plaint sought to condemn, both had value which the jury 
should be permitted to assess; (2) that the re-
mainder of the pipeline extension, consisting of 1800 feet, 
which was not to be taken, would be damaged by reason 
of the severance of it from the St. Joseph system; and 
(3) that when the Gibbs laid out their housing project, 
the area developed was within the St. Joseph franchise 
area, that they had a firm contract for sixty connections, 
had in reliance on that contract commenced construction 
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of houses, paid engineering fees, purchased the land, etc., 
all of which value was lost by reason of the waters being 
taken from the housing project. (R. 30-50) 
At the close of a three-day trial, the court ruled that 
the plaintiff did not need to take the 600 feet, and then 
held as a matter of law that the Gibbs were not to any 
extent damaged. The Town was permitted to take all 
the water and the water system, and the Gibbs were given 
nothing for their contract rights, for which they had 
paid the $800.00 connection charge. Mary Godbe Gibbs 
was permitted to intervene by Judge Cowley, but after 
the foregoing ruling, Judge Hendricks dismissed the com-
plaint in intervention. (R. 355) Later when judgment 
was entered, (R. 124) the decree was that there was "no 
cause of action" for the interveners. It is not now known 
whether the prior dismissal or the later judgment of no 
cause of action was intended to control. In any event, the 
court held that the Gibbs were entitled to no water nor 
connections, and that they had suffered no ·damages. It 
is from this judgment that the Gibbs appeal. 
The amount assessed by the jury as damages to St. 
Joseph was acceptable both to the Town and to St. 
Joseph, and the judgment has been paid. This phase of 
the case, is therefore, of no concern here. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ON POINTS RELIED 
ON IN THE APPEAL 
I. The Gibbs had an interest in the St. Joseph 
system which: (a) could not be taken by condemnation, 
because it was already devoted to the highest public use; 
and (b) if it be held that the Gibbs are wrong in this con-
4 
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tention, then in any event the interest of the Gibbs which 
~ was taken had a value which the jury should have been 
permitted to assess. 
II. Since the Gibbs had constructed a pipeline ex-
tension pursuant to an existing contract with St. Joseph 
and had made other improvements, they were entitled to 
damages when the pipeline extension was severed from 
the system of St. Joseph and thus left ·without water. 
III. It was error to permit the Town to dismiss its 
action to condemn the 600 feet extension after the close of 
the trial, in that: (a) The Town had held possession 
under an order of immediate occupancy for over seven 
months, and Gibbs was enjoined from interfering with it, 
all without compensation; and (b) the Gibbs had been 
required to protect their interest, adduce evidence, and 
in any event should have been allowed their costs when 
the Town decided at the close of the trial not to condemn. 
IV. The jury should have been permitted to deter-
mine: (a) whether or not the property of the Gibbs was 
within the St. Joseph franchise area; and (b) whether 
or not there was surplus water to fulfill the Gibbs con-
tract for new connections. 
V. It was error to permit the City to furnish water 
to six users at city rates through the Gibbs pipeline with-
out paying the Gibbs therefor. 
THE FACTS 
The St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Company was 
a public service corporation, engaged in the distribution 
and sale of culinary water. (R. 8 and 128) Its lines ran 
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north along the west side of Highway 91, (the Ogden-
Salt Lake highway) beginning at a point near the Salt 
Lake-Davis County line. Most of the users of the water 
were located west of that highway, but there were also 
users to the east. (R. 35 and 36) To show that the Gibbs 
land was within the franchise area, the Gibbs showed 
,;~ 
that up until the time of their application for sixty new 1 
connections the company had served all applicants (east 
or west of the road) adjacent to its pipelines. (R. 19) 
They had not within the president's memory ever refused 
connections. (R. 36) The president of the company de-
scribed the area served as including the Gibbs land. (R. 
18-19) The company had previously had a dispute over 
its franchise area. It complained to the Public Service 
Commission of Utah that the O'Dell Water Company, 
which served the area to the north of the St. Joseph area, 
had infringed on the St. Joseph area by furnishing water 
to one house located east of Highway 91, and one house 
located west of said highway. (R. 102) A hearing had 
been held before the Public Service Commission on this 
complaint. As a result of that hearing the Public Service 
Commission entered an order describing the north bound-
ary of the St. Joseph system. The order described the 
north boundary as extending both east and west of said 
highway 91. (R. 100, Ex. 304) The disputed O'Dell con-
nections were in the St. Joseph territory both east of 
the highway and west of the highway. (R. 102) The 
Public Service Commission order did not fix the east 
boundary or the west boundary of the St. Joseph system, 
but it did describe the north boundary, beginning at a 
point considerably east of all the Gibbs properties de-
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scribed herein. The Gibbs property adjoins U. S. I-Iigh-
way 91 on the east and lies to the extreme north end of 
the St. Joseph territory, as described in the Public Serv-
ice Commission's order. (R. 20, Ex. 3 & 4, R. 102) There 
was evidence to the effect that the land (Elias Parkin 
corner) owned now by intervener Dora Squires (pur-
chased from the Gibbs tract) had once had a water con-
nection. (R. 36) There had never been any applications 
made which had been refused. (R. 36) 
Mary Godbe Gibbs purchased land in this area, and 
a housing project was organized and construction com-
menced. (R. 183) Before commencing construction the 
Gibbs had applied in December, 1945, for sixty connec-
tions and had paid $800.00 in full payment for forty of 
these sixty connections. (R. 199) The application for the 
sixty connections was accepted and approved by St. 
Joseph. (R. 199) The Gibbs then under contract with 
St. Joseph constructed a pipeline extension from the St. 
Joseph system across U. S. Highway 91, into the area 
being developed as a housing project. (R. 214) The evi-
dence shows that in excess of $4,000.00 was expended on 
this pipeline (R. 192-3) It was stipulated that the first 
126 feet of this pipeline had a value of $750.00. (R. 353) 
At the time of these Gibbs applications for sixty con-
nections (1945) St. Joseph had two springs. One had a 
flow fixed by one witness at 27 gallons per minute. (R. 
63) The other had a flow of about five gallons per minute. 
(R. 74) The jury thus could have found that these two 
springs had a combined flow of 32 gallons per minute. 
In addition the company leased water from the McDuff 
Springs which had a flow fixed at about forty gallons 
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per minute, (R. 109) A normal family of four or five 
persons with lawn, shrubs, and normal household use 
will use about 1,000 gallons of water per day during the 
summertime when lawns are watered. (R. 126) By simple 
mathematics, it can be determined that a flow of one 
gallon per minute will yield 1440 gallons per day. The 
water of St. Joesph, plus the McDuff leased water would 
thus have furnished water for 105 connections during the 
summertime when the use was high. Richards, who only 
measured the McNiel Spring as it flowed into the reser-
voir, (and thus missed some five gallons per minute 
which wasted) testified that the combined flow which 
he had measured would furnish water for 97 families. 
(R. 110) The five gallons per minute which he did not 
measure would have furnished water for eight more fam-
ilies. At the time of the trial there were only sixty four 
connections, (Ex. 1, R. 4) eleven of which had been per-
mitted to connect after the applications by the Gibbs. 
(Ex. 10) Therefore, at the time (December) 1945, the 
Gibbs applied for sixty connections there were only fifty 
three users, and the water supply would serve 105 
families, even at the periods of heaviest use. 
Further, an application had been filed with the State 
Engineer by Ward Holbrook, president of the St. Joseph, 
for a well. The application expressly stated on page 2: 
''The supply of water coming from sources 
owned by the St. Joseph Co. and also leased to the 
St. Joseph Co. do not appear adequate to supply 
the needs of applicant and of other customers now 
connected and the numerous consumers seeking 
service from the company. In the event this appli-
cation is approved and the contemplated well pro-
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duces sufficient water, the entire flow will be used 
for the primary purposes heretofore set forth, if 
such becomes necessary to supply customers re-
questing service from said St. Joseph Water & 
Irrigation Co.'' 
This application was approved on February 25, 1947, 
and the well had been drilled with a flow of some 250 
gallons per minute, or enough water to supply some 360 
connections. This application was filed on April 30, 1946. 
(Ex. 14) Thus at the time the controversy arose, this 
well would have furnished a full water right for an addi-
tional 360 homes and thus more than have supplied the 
Gibbs application for sixty connections. Thereafter, the 
company and Holbrook made a written agreement for 
the use of the well for ten cents per 1,000 gallons pumped 
into the company lines. (R. 221) It was agreed by Hol-
brook and St. Joseph that a rate increase was necessary 
to permit repair to the system and to acquire water from 
the new well. (R. 222) The company had shown no profits 
for a number of years, and the pipeline system was badly 
in need of repair. (R. 222) An application was made for 
a rate increase. (R. 222) This was opposed by the people 
who later formed the Town of North Salt Lake. (R. 222) 
The Commission never made a ruling on this application 
in the more than two years between the date of the appli-
cation and this trial. (R. 222) 
The Gibbs discontinued further development in the 
housing project while this dispute pended. (R. 202) but 
prior thereto over $4,000.00 had been expended on pipe-
lines, (R. 192-3) at least ten homes were constructed, (R. 
195) and other sums were expended, (R. 193) and building 
lots were sold. (R. 195) The applications for the sixty 
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connections were still in good standing, and the water 
from the Holbrook well was available. 
After the Gibbs had made these expenditures and 
had· their applications approved· by the company, the 
Public Service Commission investigated the question of 
availability of water. It noted that a well was contem-
plated (p. 3 of Ex. 10) but not yet drilled; that the 
MeN eil Spring was at least temporarily unfit for use, 
and that the :McDuff water might be lost, and that in view 
of this there might not be sufficient water. It, therefore, ·:WI 
concluded that it should prohibit new connections "until 
the company has been able to determine adequately what 
its future supply will be." ( p. 5) It ordered: ( 1) that the 
tunnel to the MeN eil Spring be cleaned and repaired; (2) 
that St. Joseph discontinue new connections "pending 
completion of arrangements for an adequate suppy of 
water in the future" except that five users, plus the six 
homes in the Gibbs lands were to be connected. (p. 7 of 
Ex. 10) It is to be noted that the five persons ordered 
to be connected applied after the application for sixty 
connections were made by Gibbs. 
The MeN eil spring had been declared unfit, the Mc-
Duff lease was about to expire, (Ex. 10) and the well had 
not yet been drilled. It was because of these uncertain-
ties that the Public Service Commission prohibited new 
connections (R. Ex. lO) Throughout the trial the plain-
tiff asserted that the Public Service Commission had 
determined that the water suply was all in use and that 
it was inadequate to fill the needs of Gibbs. This is not 
correct. It merely concluded that the supply was uncer-
10 
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tain, and prohibited connections until the uncertainties 
could be cleared. (R. Ex. 10, p. 4-5,7) 
In the meantime, because of motives not material 
here, one part of the franchise area·of St. Joseph was in-
corporated into a town (North Salt Lake) and the town 
brought action to take over all of the water and the 
system. (p. 1-3) 
The property owners excluded from the town sought 
to intervene. Judge Cowley permitted the intervention of 
some, (p. 44) but Judge Hendricks dismissed them and 
denied all others the right to intervene. He then proceed-
ed to protect the rights of the six home owners who had 
been using water under the Public Service Commission 
order. (R. 353-5) However, they were not parties. They 
were given 6,000 gallons per day at town rates, (R. 354) 
and were given the right to use the Gibbs pipeline to get 
water to their lands from the St. Joseph system. They 
were not required to pay anything for either the water 
rights or the pipeline. 
The Gibbs were denied any damages for their 
$4,000.00 pipeline and four houses were left without 
water. (R. 353-5) The $800.00 which they paid for the 
sixty connections was confiscated and they were denied 
the right either to have the connections or to be paid for 
their loss. 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS GIBBS HAD AN INTEREST 
IN THE ST. JOSEPH SYSTE11: WHICH COULD 
NOT BE TAI{EN BY CONDEMNATION BECAUSE 
11 
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THE PROPERTY WAS ALREADY DEVOTED TO 
THE HIGHEST PUBLIC USE 
It must be kept in mind that the Gibbs had sixty con-
nections applied for, approved and paid for, that they 
had made six connections, completed a pipeline extension 
into the property being developed and had houses under 
construction. They thus stand on a stronger footing than 
those whose desire for water connections had not been 
formulated or approved prior to the commencement of 
this suit. It is our position that these rights, based on an 
existing contract, must in all events be given protection. 
The right of a city to acquire a water system by 
eminent domain must be conceded. Section 15-7-4, U.C.A. 
1943. Yet in exercising that right the city is controlled by 
the general statutes governing eminent domain proceed-
ings. If this were not so, then there would be no pro-
cedure prescribed, and the right of eminent domain 
would have to be denied. See Lone Star Gas v. Fort 
vVorth, 98 S.W. (2d) 799, 128 Texas 392; annotation 
109 A.L.R. 384. 
By section 104-6-3, the particular private property 
which may be taken is enumerated. It is there provided. 
''The private property which may be taken 
includes • • * 
"(3) property appropriated to public use; 
provided that such property shall not be taken 
unless for a more necessary public use than that 
to which it has already been appropriated." 
''As a general rule, property already devoted to a 
public use can not be taken for another public use which 
12 
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will totally destroy or materially interfere with the 
former use, unless the intention of the legislature that it 
should be so taken has been manifested in express terms 
or by necessary implication, mere general authority to 
exercise the power of eminent domain being in such 
case insufficient; * * * The rule also applies to property 
about to be lawfully appropriated, although the appro-
priation is not completed.'' 29 C.J.S. 862; Vermont-
Hydro Electric Corporation v. Dunn, 112 Atl. 223, 95 
Yermont 14-1:, 12 A.L.R. 1495. But ·where it is expressly 
authorized so to do, the city may take property already 
devoted to a public use if under Section 104-61-3 the pro-
posed use is a higher use. But it can not, as is attempted 
here, take service away from one territory or area (the 
area outside the town) for exclusive use in the town, for 
such would not be a higher use. 
One of the early cases dealing with this problem is 
Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, C.C.A. Cal., 284 
Fed. 794; certiorari denied 43 S. Ct. 700, 262 U. S. 751, 
67 L. Ed. 1214. There the Mono Power Company was a 
public corporation furnishing power to the inhabitants 
of several cities, towns and counties. It furnished no 
power to the City of Los Angeles. Los Angeles brought 
a condemnation proceeding to condemn all of the prop-
erty of the power company and to thus deprive the in-
habitants of the territories being served of power service. 
The court expressly noted that the problem was not mere-
ly whether one town could condemn property serving the 
inhabitants of another town. Rather it was a question 
of the collective inhabitants of the territory served, in-
cluding the county areas. See page 793. 
13 
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The statute involved was very close to our Section 
104-61-3 (3). The Court held that the property being 
devoted to serve the collective inhabitants of other areas 
by a public service company could not be taken by the 
City of Los Angeles. As noted above, the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed this decision by denying 
certiorari. 
Later in the case of East Bay Municipal Utility Dis-
trict v. Railroad Commission, 229 Pac. 949, 194 Cal. 603, a 
slightly different fact situation was presented. There, 
like here, a public service company served areas both 
within and outside the municipal district. The district 
sought to condemn all of the properties of the public 
service company, but it proposed to continue to serve 
the territory located outside the municipal district. Em-
phasis is placed on the fact that it did not merely propose 
to serve the present users located outside the district. 
Rather, it proposed to continue to serve the same "terri-
tory", but merely to change the ownership from a private 
to a public entity. On page 956 of the Pacific Reporter 
the court said that: 
"It is proposed to continue the use of the 
water to the same territory to which it has hereto-
fore been appropriated. The territory and the 
people are not to be disturbed in the use to which 
the water is now put and are to enjoy an uninter-
rupted use thereof.'' 
The court also said : 
"The change will result not in the disturb-
ance of the use or appropriation of water, but in 
the agency authorized by law to administer the 
trust.'' 
14 
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:~ 
'' 
In an early California case, City of South Pasadena 
v. Pasadena Land and Water Co1npany, 152 California 
579, 93 Pac. 490, a public water company attempted to sell 
all of its water and its distribution system to a city. 
About two-thirds of its consumers resided inside the city, 
and approximately one-third resided outside the city. 
Those residing outside the city sought a.n injunction to 
prohibit the sale by the public utility to the city. It is 
thought that this case is very close in point, because the 
city could take no more by eminent domain proceedings 
than the company could voluntarily sell-for eminent 
domain is a compulsory sale. The court held that the 
public utility could sell all of its facilities to the city, 
but it further held that the city received the .property 
subject to the same trust and duties as were imposed 
upon the utility. It expressly protected the rights of 
those persons outside the city who may "become 
entitled'' to make future connections. In so holding the 
court said: 
''The respondent is a quasi public corpora-
tion engaged in supplying water for public use. 
This is admitted, and it is also conceded that cor-
porations of that character can not, without legis-
lative sanction, transfer to another the entire 
property devoted to public service and the busi-
ness of carrying it on * * * 
"It is urged that the effect of a transfer, such 
as that here proposed, would relieve the defendant 
corporation of its duty to continue the service of 
supplying water, wliich is imposed upon it by rea-
son of its control of the water and its enjoyment 
of the constitutional franchise to use the streets 
for its pipelines, a.nd that there would be no cor-
responding transfer of the duty to the transferee 
15 
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of the property, the city of Pasadena, • • • T~e 
section does not forbid the transfer of a franchise 
so as to relieve the previous owner thereof, or 
the grantee or lessee, personally, from liability 
incurred in the operation of the franchise, if such 
a thing were possible. It merely forbids the trans-
fer of a franchise 'so as to relieve the franchise, 
or property held thereunder' from liabilities so 
incurred or contracted, • "" • 
"It appears from the complaint that for 
many years the defendant company has been 
supplying water to portions of the two cities, pre-
cisely as it does now, the area supplied in South 
Pasadena being about two-thirds of its territory, 
that more than three hundred families are now 
supplied therein from this source, and that if they 
are now deprived thereof, there is no other known 
source from which it can be replaced, and they 
would be without water for any purpose. It may 
well be assumed that Pasadena could obtain no 
sufficient quantity of water for a municipal water 
system, except by buying or condemning that por-
tion of the water of the defendant company now 
distributed to its inhabitants, or some other sup-
ply already devoted to use outside the city. _ It 
would be bad policy under these conditions tore-
quire a city, desiring to acquire water for its in-
habitants to take water in use by others for simi-
lar purposes outside its limits, where the effect 
would be to devastate and depopulate such out-
side territory. To condemn the individual right of 
each member of the outside community would be 
impracticable, and even if it could legally be done 
it would probably prove too costly for the re-
sources of the city. To separate the supply and 
endeavor to control, manage, and if necessary 
develop and increase the supply from time to time, 
in concert or partnership with some other corpora-
16 
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tion, would probably cause many complications, 
and render the successful administration of the 
municipal system much more difficult and doubt-
ful. In order to nrromplish the purpose for which 
these powers were given, it is reasonably certain 
that it would be advisable, and it might be neces-
sary, for the rity to take over a supply already 
partly in use outside, and continue the service to 
the outside territory, while supply the remainder 
to the use of its own people * * * Having taken 
over the whole system subject to the burden of 
supplying part of the water to the inhabitants of 
South Pasadena, the city of Pasadena will have no 
greater rights or powers, respecting that part of 
the service than its grantor previously had. It 
will be under the same obligation as its grwntor to 
continue the service and to supply the water to all 
persons who may become entitled to it in the 
future, so long as it retains possession and con-
trol of the property so charged * * * The city will 
not sell its surplus * * * in the sense intended by 
the statute. The right to the use of the required 
quantity of this water is now vested in the city of 
South Pasadena, and its inhabitants within the 
portion of its territory where it is to be served 
and the City of Pasadena does not propose to take 
away this right. It is about to buy only the right 
of the Pasadena Land & Water Company to the 
water which did not include this use. It will be 
obligated to put it to the same use as fully as 
that company is now compelled to do so. Water 
which is in this manner dedicated to the use of 
an outside community, can not be at the same time 
surplus water subject to sale to others. The sale 
is already, in effect accomplished. The City of 
Pasadena, with respect to this part of the water 
will hold title as a mere trustee, bound to apply 
it to the use of these beneficially interested. 
17 
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This is one of the earliest California cases. The 
later cases which are cited and discussed above frequently 
speak of the duty of the city to supply water to the 
"terri tory" or "area" previously served by the private 
water company whose property was condemned. Here 
the town has throughout this proceeding argued that its 
duty is only to those persons who already had water con-
nections and were actually using water, that its duty 
ceased when it furnished them with the quantity of water 
which they were using at the time the suit was brought. 
They have contended that the right to make new connec-
tions in the future rests entirely with the members of the 
town, and that the territory previously served by St. 
Joseph can make no increased use, nor have any new 
connections. This idea is expressly negative by the Pasa-
dena case. The court on page "956 of the Pacific reporter 
expressly said that the city in taking over the private 
water company would be obligated to supply not only the 
existing needs, but "it will be under the same obligation 
as its grantor to continue the service and to supply the 
water to all persons who may become entitled to it in the 
future, so long as it retains possession and control of the 
property so charged," citing Fellows v. Los Angeles, an-
other California case. It seems crystal clear to us that 
this property, which was devoted to a public service, be-
came charged with a public trust. As is discussed in the 
next subdivision, this corporation, the St. Joseph, could 
not have taken the property from this public trust. Coun-
sel for the town repeatedly asserted this proposition in 
the trial in an attempt to hold down the money damages. 
They objected time and again to questions designed to 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ascertain the Yalue of this property for purposes other 
than supplying water to the inhabitants of the town and 
said that: "this water is already devoted to a public serv-
ice, and it can not be used for anything else.'' Having 
thus gained their point, they now argue that by this con-
demnation suit they freed this property from part of the 
public trust, to wit, the duty of supplying service to the 
franchise area. While the cases dealing squarely with 
this point are not numerous, those which are available 
sustain the position taken by appellants that this prop-
erty, insofar as it was supplying the needs of persons 
who reside outside the town was already devoted to the 
highest public use and could not be taken by eminen~ 
domain, except subject to the same trust. As said by the 
court in the South Pasadena case, the trust which was 
imposed upon the property was such as to permit those 
in the franchise area who "may become entitled" to use 
water in the future to make their water connections. 
These appellants would have had no particular com-
plaint had the trial court compelled the Town to honor 
the approved applications for 60 connections which the 
St. Joseph had agreed to and had undertaken to serve. 
But this court refused to do. It gave only limited protec-
tion to the six persons who were actually using water. 
It limited them forever to 6,000 gallons per day, and all 
of the other territory outside the town was forever 
denied the right to any water. This holding abolished the 
contract rights of the Gibbs with St. Joseph. 
It simply can not be that it is a higher public use for 
an inhabitant of the Town of North Salt Lake to have a 
drink of water, than it is for an inhabitant living imme-
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diately outside the town boundary. Both of said inhabit-
ants were within the St. Joseph franchise area. By sec-
tion 100-1-5 all uses of water are made public uses. Under 
the general law already clearly established here in Utah 
any inhabitant of the franchise area could have com-
pelled St. Joseph to allow it to connect on to the system. 
See Home Owners Loan v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235 at 
242, 92 P. ( 2d) 346. Had the system continued in the 
ownership of St. Joseph and water were available, the 
Gibbs, under the holding of the Home Owners Loan case, 
could have compelled St. Joseph to give to them suffi-
cient water for the connections. Their applications gave 
them a priority to the next sixty connections if water was 
or became available. As will be demonstrated below, the 
jury not only could have found, but probably would have 
been compelled to find that there was surplus water in 
the St. Joseph system in quantities more than adequate 
to supply the connections asked for by the Gibbs. 
The property of St. Joseph had been dedicated to 
public use. One person witliin the franchise area had a 
right to connections equal to the right of any other person 
within that area. If there were not water for both, then 
priority of application should control. Yet the trial court 
here cancelled the 60 approved applications and gave 
the exclusive right to make new connections to the people 
of the town. It refused to let the jury determine whether 
there was sufficient water for both. Its ruling is that if 
a person resides in a town he has a preferential right to 
have a drink of water superior to persons residing out-
side the town; that it is a higher public use for persons 
reRiding in the franchise area of St. Joseph (if they will 
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~ ' 
incorporate into a town) to haYP water than for the 
persons residing outside the town to have water. 
The cases cited above will not permit such a holding. 
The Mono Power case would prohibit the city from con-
demning the system at all. The East Bay ft'lunicipal 
Utility District rase would permit the town to take the 
system but would make them carry on the same trust--
the same duty-to the territory previously served. The 
Pasadena case obligated the city to hold the water in 
trust both for the existing users and for those in the 
territory served "who may become entitled" to use it. 
The contention that the people outside the town could 
only be allowed water if it were surplus to the needs of the 
town under a. situation such as this was also expressly 
denied in the case of Sacramento Municipal Utility Dis-
trict v. Pacific Gas & Electric, 165 P. (2d) 750. In that 
case the nature of the burden assumed by a town when it 
takes over a public service company rendering service 
both within and outside the town is further described. It 
there stated that the town's burden is not limited to furn-
ishing service from its surplus water. It must take over 
the duties of the public service company and perform 
the obligations of the trust it owed, because it had de-
.- voted its property to a public service. It must take over 
the duties of the public service company to furnish the 
territory previously served so far as it is possible to do 
so. In this regard the court said : 
"One of the contentions advanced by appel-
lant in this connection, to the effect that it is only 
the surplus energy that may be used for the serv-
ice of persons outside the district, does not find 
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support in the authorities. It is held that this is 
not the theory on which such service may be pro-
vided, but it is rather the theory that in taking 
over facilities serving another area, the district 
must, on principles of fairness and justice, con-
tinue the service which was furnished outside the 
district, where this can be done efficiently and 
economically. 'In these operations the munici-
pality is not selling surplus or excess waters to the 
prior users. The purchase of the system is im-
pressed with a trust * * *' Durrant v. City of 
Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137, 102 P. 2d 
759, 761.'' 
There are not a great number of cases dealing with 
this subject. It seems to be clearly established that hiso-
far as facilities devoted solely to the needs of the Town 
are concerned it is a higher public use for the Town to 
own its own system. For this reason, the principle is 
established in the textbooks and in the cases that a town 
can condemn a public service corporation which is serv-
ing the area embraced by the town. In order for the town 
so to do, it must have express legislative authority, but 
once granted that authority it does have this power. This 
matter is considered in great detail in an annotation in 
173 ALR beginning a page 1362. Further along in said 
annotation a.t pages 1376-78, the right of a city to con-
demn a public service corporation which serves people, 
both within and without the town area, is described. 
A very limited number of cases are there noted, but 
uniformly they are to the effect that if the town does 
take over a utility which is serving an area outside the 
town it must perform that company's public duty to that 
territory. The Mono Pou:er Company case is cited along 
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with Plainfield Union. Tr ater Company r. Plainfield, 83 
New Jersey Law, 332, 86 Atl. 311. 
(a) Sf. Joseph co~tld not have withdrawn service 
from any of its franchise area by a vohtntary sale or 
otherwise. 
To further demonstrate the fact that the peoples of 
a franchise area do have an interest in the discontinuance 
of service, reference is made to that group of cases which 
prohibit a public utility from withdrawing service from 
particular areas without legislative authority. It is 
clear from these cases that persons located in the fran-
chise area had a right to be heard before St. Joseph could 
have withdrawn service itself. If it could not have Yo]un-
tarily done so, it is difficult to see upon what principle 
service could be withdrawn from the area by eminent 
domain proceedings. It was upon this principle that the 
users outside the city sought to enjoin the sale of a pri-
vate water company to Pasadena in the South Pasadena 
case supra. The court said that the persons being served 
would have an interest which had to be protected. It pro-
tected it by permitting the city to buy the system, but 
held that the property was imposed with a trust to serve 
both existing users and those "who may become entitled" 
to service in the future. 
The books are full of cases wherein a utility has at-
tempted to withdraw service from a particular area or to 
change the nautre of the services rendered. See, for 
example, two Utah cases, L. A. and 8. L. R. Company v. 
Public Service Commission, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. (2d) 358, 
and L. A. and S. L. R. Company v. Public Service Com-
m,ission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287. 
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The principle is well stated in an early Connecticut 
case, Gates v. Boston &; N. Y. Air Line R. Co., 53 Conn. 
333, 5 Atl. 695, and in an annotation at 11 ALR 252. In 
the Gates case the court said: 
'' * * * Having exercised those powers, the cor-
poration has no right, against the will of the state, 
to abandon the enterprise, tear up its track, and 
sell its rolling stock and other property, and 
divide the proceeds among the stockholders. The 
possible effects of the exercise of such a claimed 
power are utter disaster to the great interests of 
the state, certain destruction of private property 
in which whole communities, created and existing 
upon the faith of the continuous use of the char-
tered powers, are interested ; and, indeed, the 
life of the citizen as well as his property rights 
are thus jeopardized. Upon principle it would 
seem plain that railroad property once devoted 
and essential to public use must remain pledged 
to that use, so as to carry to full completion the 
purpose of its creation; and that this public right, 
existing by reason of the public exigency, demand-
ed by the occasion, and created by the exercise by 
a private person of the powers of a state, is 
superior to the property rights of corporations, 
stockholderB, and bondholders.'' 
CONCLUSION ON POINT I 
The evidence is undisputed that St. Joseph owned 
in its own right and leased from McDuff sufficient water 
to furnish 105 connections. The evidence is also uncon-
troverted that St. Joseph had a written contract to use 
at a rate of ten cents per thousand gallons the 250 gallon 
flow of the Holbrook well. Combined, these water sources 
would have furnished a complete water supply for well 
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11.: 
over 450 connections. At the time of the trial it was stipu-
lated that there were only 64 connections. It is thus crys-
tal clear that there was adequate water under the control 
of St. Joseph to furnish water for all of the 60 applica-
tions which were made by the Gibbs. The applications 
had been made, approved and paid for. The pipeline 
extension had been completed, and houses were under 
construction before the condemnation suit was brought. 
Certainly the Gibbs had established a right to have water 
connections which St. Joseph could not have refused. 
The water and the property had been dedicated to public 
use and were imposed with a public trust. The cases ap-
pear to permit the town to condemn the system, but 
deny the right of the town to free the property from the 
obligations of its previous trust. The Town was obligated 
to furnish water and to perform the obligations that St. 
Joseph would have had had it retained ownership of the 
system. Under the Pasadena case and the others cited, 
the obligation of the town was to furnish water to all 
existing users outside the town, to those who had esta-
blished a right to water like the Gibbs, and also to those 
who might become entitled to use the water in the future 
in the franchise area. The Gibbs are not interested par-
ticularly in establishing the principle that all persons in 
the franchise area must be served. They base their case 
squarely upon the fact that they had connections ap-
proved and paid for, that they had made the necessary 
pipeline installations. They had existing rights as against 
the St. Joseph to the available water of the St. Joseph 
system. We think the law is as laid down in the Pasadena 
rase, that the Gibbs would be entitled to water, even 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without the approved applications, but certainly in view 
of the approved applications the Gibbs had rights which 
could not legally be taken. 
Since the Town did not condemn the St. Joseph con-
tract to purchase water from the Holbrook well the mat-
ter is .left somewhat muddled. Had the Town taken 
over all of the water supply of St. Joseph, including its 
contract rights to the Holbrook well, then a decision that 
the Town was required to serve the Gibbs would have dis-
posed of this case. But since the Town has acquired only 
the 27 gallons per minute flow from the springs owned 
by St. Joseph, it does not have sufficient water to meet 
its existing needs, and of course will in the future be 
compelled either to acquire the McDuff water, (which 
already has been devoted to public use by St. Joseph) or 
the water from the Holbrook well. It seems that the 
Town should be prohibited, as we contended, from tak-
ing the St. Joseph system at all, unless it can perform 
the trust which had been assumed by St. Joseph. By 
breaking up the system as it has done, it has rendered it 
impossible for the Gibbs to get water. Unless the Town 
increases its supply and is obligated then to supply water 
for the sixty connections, or unless the system is returned 
to St. Joseph, which can continue to perform its trust 
the Gibbs cannot be protected. The Gibbs do not care 
"'lvhich is done, but it is their desire to procure water for 
the sixty connections rather than to have damages for the 
taking of their contract rights and severance damages to 
their pipeline and housing project. 
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POINT II 
IF THE PROPERTY OF ST. JOSEPI-I COULD BE 
FREED OF ITS OBLIGATION TO SERVE THE 
SIXTY CONNECTIONS OF THE GIBBS, THEN IN 
ANY EVENT, THE GIBBS WERE ENTITLED TO 
COillPENSATION. 
There could be no principle which would justify the 
termination and avoidance of the Gibbs contract rights, 
and since they were destroyed they must be compensated 
for. Being property rights, they are protected by the 
provisions both of the Federal and State constitutions 
which prohibit a taking of property without just compen-
sation. This principle is too well established to need cita-
tion of authority. 
There is no evidence even to suggest that the Gibbs 
did not have a valid contract with St. Joseph for sixty 
water connections. There likewise can be do doubt that 
those contract rights have been destroyed by the taking of 
the property in a suit to which both St. Joseph and the 
Gibbs were parties and in which the Gibbs asserted their 
rights, but were awarded no interest. 
It is a familiar principle in eminent domain proceed-
ings that where several parties have an interest in the 
property being taken, their rights must be separately 
valued and each must be paid for his interest. See for 
example, Lewis on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Sec-
tions 716-719. See also 29 C. J. S., Section 236 (b), page 
204, wherein the rights of a lessor and lessee, landlord 
and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee, trustee and bene-
fieiary, etc. are discussed. It is there stated that both 
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the lessor and the lessee, the landlord and the tenant, 
etc. are necessary parties to the condemnation suit, and 
that the rights of each must be fixed. Here Gibbs had 
a contract interest in the St. Joseph system and were 
not only proper parties, but were necessary parties to the 
taking of that interest and the termination of their con-
tracts. If the property was to be taken (and we stren-
uously deny the right of the city to take it free of its 
obligations) then this interest of the Gibbs should have 
been paid for by someone, and it should have been asses-
sed by this same jury, not by some subsequent or other 
jury. 
One case which clearly holds that the Gibbs contract 
with the utility was a property interest in the property 
taken, is the case of Plainfield Unrion Water Company v. 
Plainfield, 83 New Jersey Law 332, 86 Atl. 311. The 
court there held that one city could not condemn a water 
Dystem already devoted to serve several other areas. It 
based its holding upon the fact that the statutes were not 
broad enough to permit such condemnation. In reach-
ing this conclusion the court discussed the nature of the 
rights of these other areas which had contracts with the 
utility for service. The court said that by reason of these 
contracts the areas had an interest in the system, that 
their interest entitled them to water, that the contracts 
were unique in th~at they could be specifically enforced 
by mandamus to compel a water connection, and that 
had the legislature permitted the city to condemn the 
utility then the holders of these contract rights would be 
rntitled to compensation. 
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The principle is no different ht>rP. The Gibbs had 
a contract interest with the St. Joseph. Under a letter 
dated the 14th day of December, 1945. they submitted an 
application for sixty eonnections. (Defendant's exhibit 
8) The corporation, by a resolution of its Board of Di-
rectors, approved these applications. (R. 199) Thereafter 
on December 18, 19-!5, the Gibbs sent a letter acknowledg-
ing the connections and gave their check No. 873 for 
$800.00 in payment therefore. (Defendant's Exhibit 8) 
At that time there was not even the most remote idea 
that the system would be condemned. The Town of North 
Salt Lake had not yet even been incorporated. Nor was 
there any plan afoot to incorporate it. Gibbs simply want-
ed to develop a housing project and applied to St. Joseph 
for -water. If the St. Joseph had not had sufficient water 
to supply these connections, then the Gibbs would never 
have gotten them, because under no circumstances could 
the company have taken away from its existing users to 
meet applications for new connections filed by the Gibbs. 
It was a public utility under the regulation of the Public 
Service Commission, and any apprehension that Gibbs 
was going to take away from the other users their right 
to use water was indeed far-fetched. He did, however, 
establish a priority to the sixty connections into the sys-
tem. The evidence is clear that there was sufficient 
water. The system was delapidated, and part of the 
water was wasted, but the flow of water was adequate 
if the system were repaired. 
There can thus be no doubt that the Gibbs had a 
valid contract for sixty connections, that they had paid 
$800.00 for them and were obligated to pay an additional 
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$400.00. The water was available to serve their needs. 
In reliance on these contracts, and pursuant to the 
express requirements thereof, the Gibbs proceeded to in-
stall a pipeline extension. It is to be noted from their 
arrangement with St. Joseph that they were required to 
install the pipeline and to transfer it to St. Joseph, after 
they had been paid therefor from the revenues from the 
sale of water. (R. 199) St. Joseph later relinquished all 
of its claim to the pipeline. (R. 223) But the Gibbs did 
install the pipeline pursuant to contract and in reliance 
on its contract rights. When the town condemned the 
system, it should have been compelled in any event to 
compensate the Gibbs for the reasonable value of these 
contract rights, and as is set out in more detail below, 
they should have been allowed severance damages for the 
severance of their pipeline and other properties from 
the St. Joseph system. 
POINT III 
SINCE THE GIBBS HAD CONSTRUCTED A PIPE-
LINE EXTENSION PURSUANT TO AN EXISTING 
CONTRACT WITH ST. JOSEPH AND MADE 
OTHER IMPROVEMENTS, THEY WERE ENTITL-
ED TO DAMAGES WHEN THE PIPELINE EXTEN-
SION WAS SEVERED FROM THE SYSTEM OF 
ST. JOSEPH AND THUS LEFT WITHOUT WATER 
The Gibbs, in reliance upon an existing contract with 
St. Joseph, constructed a pipeline extension at a cost in 
excess of $4,000.00. They not only had the approved ap-
plications for sixty connections, but the company had 
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expressly agreed with the Gibbs that if they would con-
struct a pipeline extension from the St. Joseph pipeline 
to their housing project, that they would be reimbursed 
therefor by the company from the proceeds from the sale 
of water in the Gibbs subdivision. (R. 199) Counsel read 
from the corporation minutes, upon the stipulation of the 
parties as follows : 
"Mr. L. W. Gibbs presented a letter request-
ing extension of water service to supply the new 
homes about to be constructed in Hillside Gardens; 
upon a motion of \V ard C. Holbrook this extension 
was authorized with the understanding that the 
work be done by :Mr. Gibbs, and that the cost of 
labor and materials be paid for by L. W. Gibbs, 
with the understanding that the said L. W. Gibbs 
be refunded all accounts collected for water serv-
ice and water connections during a period of five 
years from the time of the completion of the ex-
tension in accordance with the conditions of para-
graph 11 of the Rules and Regulations." 
Pursuant to that arrangement, Gibbs paid $800.00 
for forty of the sixty connections, and by his letter of 
December 18, 1945, he agreed to pay for the remaining 
twenty connections as the housing construction progres-
sed. (Ex. 8) Gibbs thereupon commenced the construction 
of the pipeline system. The evidence is uncontradicted 
that he paid $100.00 to A. Z. Richards for engineering 
work in laying out the system. ~R. 192) He paid the 
Higham Plumbing Company $747.50 on July 14, 1946, 
and $817.20 on July 31, 1946, for plumbing supplies and 
work shown on two statements introduced as Exhibit 7. 
(R. 172) He paid Grant Tuft $775.50 for installation of 
other pipelines, the Chytraus Construction Company 
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$839.38 for construction work on the pipe](ines and 
$900.00 to the Waterworks Equipment Company for 
pipe. (R. 189) All of these expenditures were made pur-
suant to a valid and subsisting contract entered into more 
than two years prior to the bringing of this condemna-
tion suit. When the company was stopped by these pro-
ceedings from furnishing water, it disclaimed all interest 
in the pipeline. (R. 223) So it is clear that the Gibbs 
owned the pipelines, that they expended well over $4,000 
to construct them, and that they were constructed under 
valid, subsisting contracts. As has been demonstrated 
above, St. Joseph had under its control sufficient water 
to supply in excess of 450 connections, and at the time of 
the trial it was supplying only 64, so that had this system 
remained under the control of St. Joseph the Gibbs would 
have had water for their pipeline, and through the sale 
of water would have been reimbursed for their costs of 
installing it. Both the contract right which entitled them 
to the connections and the investment in the pipeline 
system have been totally destroyed and rendered worth-
less by ,this condemnation suit. 
This case must be distinguished from those cases where 
members of the general public have constructed improve-
ments on their own land in reliance on the location of 
a railroad track or a highway which is later changed. 
Such people have no rights for which they can be paid 
money damages, if the utility discontinues operation or 
the highway is moved to suit the greater public conven-
ience. But such is not the law where the facility is con-
structed pursuant to a contract with the utility to render 
service, and the utility then seeks to withdraw service 
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without paying for the value of the improvement. Again 
the fact situation is one upon which there has not been 
a great deal of litigation. There is, however, an annota-
tion in 23 ALR 555, in which the general rule is given as 
stated above. Of course, in no case is the utility permit-
ted simply to abandon service without getting authority 
of the regulatory department of the State. This is dis-
cussed in detail above with the cases that hold that the 
person being served has an interest in continued service, 
and that property once devoted to public use can not be 
withdrawn from public service, except with legislative 
authority. However, in those cases where legislative 
authority to withdraw is granted, the utility generally 
may discontinue its line without paying its customers 
damages because of its abandonment or relocation. The 
particular cases covered by the annotation in 23 ALR 555 
deal with the change in location of railroad tracks and 
facilities. After giving the general rule that damages 
can not be recovered by the public at large the annotation 
then refers to a group of cases where the service is being 
rendered or improvements were installed pursuant to a 
contract. In such instances, the courts hold that damages 
may be recovered if the service is taken away. 
No other rule could be justified either in law or 
morals. Where a customer of a public utility which is 
obligated by law to render service enters into a firm 
contract with that utility under the terms of which the 
customer constructs connecting facilities, the utility can 
not discontinue service without paying damages to the 
customer whose facilities have thus been rendered value-
less. The rule waul d be otherwise were there not a con-
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tract, but where, as here, there is a contract and the pipe-
line was constructed pursuant to it, the cases appear to 
hold uniformly that persons in the position of the Gibbs 
in this case must be paid damages when their contract! 
is confiscated and their investment (J!J'td facilities under 
the contract are rendered worthless. It is no different in 
principle from a person who leases my farm and pur-
suant to the lease constructs valuable improvements 
thereon. Thereafter a public agency condemns the farm, 
destroys the improvements and terminates the lease. 
There is no principle under which the condemnor should 
be permitted to thus destroy the improvement and the 
contract without paying to the lessee the value of the 
property thus taken. 
In the instant case the property taken consisted only 
of the contract rights, which entitled the Gibbs to water 
and the connections but in addition damages should have 
been assessed because of the destruction of the value of 
the property not taken. There should be no doubt that 
the Gibbs are entitled to damages, because they were 
connected on to the system of St. Joseph pursuant to a 
valid contract. They were severed from that system, and 
their contract was abbrogated. They are without water 
and have a pipeline system constructed at a cost in excess 
of $4,000.00, which is now worthless, because there is no 
water to fill it. Further, they had started the construc-
tion of several homes and had made other expenditures 
in connection with their property, all of which are value-
less without culinary water. Severance damage should 
have been assessed by the jury, and the Gibbs should have 
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.-
been compensated therefor by the Town of North Salt 
Lake. 
(a) WAS THERE SURPLUS WATER IN 
THE SYSTEM~ 
The contention has been made and undoubtedly will 
be made on this appeal that there was not surplus water. 
Our position in this regard simply is that the jury could 
have found that there was surplus water under the control 
of St. Joseph. The Gibbs and St. Joseph tendered special 
interrogatories calculated to have the jury determine 
whether or not there was surplus water, and whether 
or not there was a contract. The court simply held that 
as a matter of law the Gibbs had no interest in the 
matter and refused to permit the jury to make the deter-
mination. We believe that the evidence is so strong on 
this point that a jury could not have found otherwise 
than that there were valid contracts, that there was sur-
plus water, etc., but we need not go that far. Certainly 
it can not be successfully urged that a jury could not 
have found from the evidence adduced that there was 
surplus water and that the other conditions outlined 
above did exist. It is respectfully submitted that if the 
system can be taken free of the trust (its obligation to 
furnish the territory previously served), then in any 
event the Gibbs were entitled to compensation for their 
contract rights and severance damages to their pipeline, 
homes and other properties. 
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POINT IV 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE TOWN TO DIS-
MISS ITS ACTION TO CONDEMN THE SIX 
HUNDRED FEET EXTENSION 
The Town held possession under an order of imme-
diate occupancy and Gibbs was enjoined from interfering 
with the occupancy, all without compensation. In this 
regard appellants consider the case of Salt Lake City v. 
Moyle, 111 Utah 201, 176 Pac. (2d) 882, to be directly.in 
point and controlling. At the time the action was filed 
by plaintiff on November 16, 1948, the complaint sought 
to condemn 600 feet of pipeline which was owned by the 
Gibbs. (R. 4) The complaint asked for immediate occu-
pancy and a hearing was held thereon. The court granted 
the order of immediate occupancy, by a minute order on 
December 28, 1948, and the written order was filed on 
February 7, 1949. (R. 20, 35) In the order of immediate 
occupancy Gibbs was enjoined from interfering with the 
property described in the co~plaint. This order of occu-
pancy and the injunction continued until after the trial. 
At that time the plaintiff indicated that it did not want 
to condemn the entire 600 feet, but only 126 feet thereof. 
The parties stipulated that the 126 feet which was still to 
be taken had a value of $750.00. 
The verdict which was submitted to the jury even 
had on it the $750.00 item. (P. 125) The judgment which 
was finally entered recited that a motion had been made 
to dismiss the action as to Lauren W. Gibbs conditionally, 
and the court granted to the Town the right to take 126 
feet of the Gibbs pipeline if it desired to do so upon condi-
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tion of the Town paying the Gibbs $750.00. The court 
then provided in its judgment that the plaintiff did not 
need to take any of the pipeline, unless it elected to do so. 
It, therefore, permitted the plaintiff to dismiss the action 
to take oYer the Gibbs pipeline at the end of the trial and 
after the. jury verdict. 
The Gibbs had been placed to the expense of defend-
ing their rights and proving their damages, and in addi-
tion the town had been granted the immediate occupancy 
of said pipeline and the Gibbs had been enjoined from 
interfering with that occupancy. The trial was had in 
September and the minute order on immediate occupancy 
was entered in December of the previous year. The Town 
therefore, held occupancy of the Gibbs pipeline and the 
Gibbs were enjoined from interfering with it for nine 
months. The Gibbs had been given no indication during 
the trial that the pipeline was not going to be condemned, 
and of course made no effort to prove what damage they 
had suffered by reason of the order of immediate occu-
pancy. But the case was dismissed without giving the 
Gibbs any compensation. If the entire action had been 
dismissed before trial the Gibbs could have then brought 
their action for damages for the nine months of occu-
pancy, but here the matter was not dismissed until after 
the trial. If the Town decided it did not want to take this 
particular property, then certainly the Gibbs should have 
been awarded damages and this jury should have been 
permitted to assess them for the nine months of occu-
pancy by the town. Secondly, After the Gibbs had been 
required to go through a three day trial, had been placed 
to the expense of employing an attorney, called witnesses, 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
etc., to defend against the taking of their property, the 
court permitted this order that the town had an election 
as to whether it would take the pipe line. Defendants had 
to prove its value because it appeared that the line was 
to be taken. Certainly the Town should be required to 
pay those expenses. In this regard they should have 
been compelled to pay the attorney fee as well as t~e 
court costs incurred by the Gibbs in defending an action 
which the city later decided to dismiss. 
POINT V 
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED, 
(A) TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE 
PROPERTY OF THE GIBBS WAS WITHIN THE 
ST. JOSEPH AREA, AND (B) WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE WAS SURPLUS WATER TO FULFILL 
THE GIBBS CONTRACT FOR NEW CONNECTIONS 
Both St. Joseph and the Gibbs requested the court 
to permit the jury to answer special interrogatories con-
cerning the availability of water under the Gibbs con-
tract for connections, and whether or not the Gibbs land 
was within the St. Joseph franchise area. (R. 68, 70, 71) 
These rna tters were of importance in determining the 
question of damages to the Gibbs. When the court re-
jljl 
:~r 
fused to permit the jury to award the Gibbs any damages ~ 
by its refusal to submit defendant's requested ins true- j hl~ 
tion No. 5. (R. 78), then the question of whether or not 
there was surplus water and whether or not the land was . :~· 
within the franchise area failed too. It is the contention 
of the appellants that the jury should have been permit-
ted to find from the evidence actually produced that there 
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was surplus water, that the Gibbs were within the St. 
Joseph franchise area, and that there were valid con-
tract rights held by the Gibbs in the St. Joseph system. 
The refusal of the court to submit these matters to a jury 
was error, and it should be corrected here, so that on a 
re-trial of the damage question these matters can be 
brought properly before the jury. Further is was error 
to admit the order of the Public Service Commission re-
garding water availability. The question as to whether 
there was sufficient water was for the jury and it would 
not be controlled by any determination of that question 
by any other agency. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE CITY TO FUR-
NISH WATER TO SIX USERS AT CITY RATES 
THROUGH THE GIBBS PIPELINE WITHOUT 
PAYING THE GIBBS THEREFOR. 
It should also be noted that the court provided that 
6,000 gallons of water per day was to be delivered by the 
Town into the Gibbs pipeline for the benefit of six people 
who were not parties to the action, and they were given 
permission in the action to utilize the Gibbs pipeline to 
convey their water from the St. Joseph system to their 
own houses. The Gibbs were given no compensation for 
this encumbrance placed on their pipeline, and this was 
also error. There is nor can be no legal basis upon which 
the Town could be granted permission to deliver water 
through the Gibbs pipeline to the six individuals named 
in the judgment without paying the Gibbs some compen-
sation for the use thereof. The judgment specifically 
provided tlu~.t the Town would receive from said six users 
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city rates for the use of the water. The Town is thus 
given all of the revenue therefrom and the Gibbs pipe-
line is encumbered by this use, and still the court held 
that it was not taken and that the Gibbs were entitled to 
no compensation. The order providing for delivery of 
the 6,000 gallons per day into the pipeline is shown in the 
record at page 127. The right of the city to collect city 
rates therefore was prescribed by the court at pages 
354-5 of the record, in its oral order and on page 178 of 
the written judgment. This order was excepted to, (R. 
359) but without avail. Certainly, the city should not be 
permitted to collect city rates for furnishing water 
through the Gibbs pipeline to users who are strangers to 
the Gibbs, but that is the effect of the order. We think it 
is tantamount to taking the Gibbs property even though 
the court ruled that it was not being taken, and we 
respectfully submit that this was error. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, the appellants Gibbs contend 
that by reason of their contracts with the St. Joseph they 
had an interest in the property of the St. Joseph equal 
to the right of the six individuals (actual users of water) 
whose rights were protected by the court; that this 
interest gave them a right to water connections with St. 
Joseph, for which they could have used the writ of man-
damus to enforce; that the properties of St. Joseph were 
imposed with the burden and obligations to honor these 
contract rights; and that the Town could not take the 
portion of the system necessary to supply those rights 
except by assuming the same trust and obligations which 
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were imposed upon this property while dedicated to 
public use by St. Joseph. 
If the court should hold that the Gibbs interest could 
be taken without any obligations, then these appellants 
contend that the termination of their contracts and the 
severance of their pipeline system and their home de-
velopments from a source of culinary water was a taking 
of property without compensation. I caution the court 
not to misunderstand us as basing this contention upon 
the mere fact that the Gibbs were in the St. Joseph Fran-
chise area. Their position is much stronger than that. It 
is based upon the fact that they had firm existing con-
tracts with St. Joseph, that those contracts were termin-
ated by the taking. Secondly, the improvements which 
were made were also made pursuant to contracts with 
St. Joseph, and it is upon the basis of these contract 
rights that the appellants contend that they had an in-
terest which was terminated and taken without compen-
sation. 
Further, the property of the Gibbs was occupied by 
the Town from December until September, and the Town 
furnished water through the pipe line to six water users 
and took the revenues therefrom without compensating 
the Gibbs. They should not have been permitted to dis-:-
miss their action without compensating the Gibbs for dam-
ages during the time the property was occupied by the 
Town and for their costs in defending an action which 
was dismissed at the end of the trial. Finally, the order 
permitting six people to continue to take water through 
the Gibbs pipeline, and permitting the Town to receive 
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the revenues therefrom, imposed a burden on the Gibbs 
property which is tantamount to taking it without com-
pensation. On these bases, we submit that judgment of 
the court must be reversed. Upon the uncontradicted 
evidence regarding Mr. Gibbs contracts the court should 
adjudge and dete-rmine the rights of Gibbs to connections 
without the necessity of a new trial. If, the court should 
determine that the Gibbs are not to be protected' as to 
connections, then the damages must be assessed for the 
taking. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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